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PRESERVING HUMAN AGENCY IN
AUTOMATED COMPLIANCE
Onnig H. Dombalagian*
ABSTRACT
As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the
regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. The imperative of real-
time, prophylactic regulation increasingly compels reallocation of
regulatory and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement
technology. At the same time, in light of the well-known weaknesses of
automated systems, securities firms (and their regulators) must temper
investment in automation with efforts to augment the agency of compliance
professionals. This symposium contribution considers how investment in the
professional development of compliance personnel can better integrate
automated tools within established compliance and supervisory structures
and thereby advance regulatory and operational objectives.
INTRODUCTION
As technology transforms financial services, so too must it transform the
regulation of financial markets and intermediaries. Technology and
automation have enabled investment banks and brokerage firms to offer
financial services to investors of all wealth and income levels and has made
participation in the financial market possible for millions of households,
whether in planning for college, retirement, or other major financial life
events.1 As with other professional services,2 the automation of securities
brokerage—and the prospect of automating investment advice—has led
commentators to speculate whether human traders and advisers have the skill
and intuition to “beat the machines” or whether the rise of the “robots” will
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James Fanto, Roberta Karmel, Arthur Pinto, Brooklyn Law School and the Brooklyn Journal of
Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law for the invitation to participate in this symposium issue,
as well as my fellow contributors, presenters, and participants for their thoughtful and helpful
comments. I am also grateful to my colleagues at Tulane Law School, particularly Ann Lipton, for
their comments at our Faculty Scholarship Symposium. Finally, I would also like to thank Tom
Gosselin and Ravi Varma for their research assistance. All errors are mine.
1. See, e.g., ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING:
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 238–42, 276–80 (2007) (arguing that automation and real-time
computation reduced the cost of account management).
2. See generally DAVIDA. MINDELL, OUR ROBOTS, OURSELVES: ROBOTICS AND THEMYTHS
OF AUTONOMY (2016); Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment:
How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 36–42 (Oxford Martin Sch., Working Paper, Sept.
17, 2013), http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment.
pdf (forecasting the probability that tasks performed by different professions—including legal and
financial services—may be partially or fully automated within the next few decades).
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ultimately displace securities professionals for all but the most complex
trading and investment strategies.3
Perhaps less glamorously, technology has also transformed the way we
approach the regulation of traditional securities brokerage, dealing, and
advisory services.4 The complexity of algorithmic trading has forced
regulatory agencies and self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to respond with
new tools for gathering information and surveilling markets. As algorithms
increasingly manage trading books and securities accounts, individual firms
have proposed and developed automated tools to support—and, some fear, to
supplant—compliance personnel. More generally, the imperative of real-
time, prophylactic regulation in the wake of the serial crashes and panics of
the twenty-first century will increasingly compel reallocation of regulatory
and compliance budgets to surveillance and enforcement technology.5
Senior regulators and compliance officers must therefore make difficult
decisions as to how to integrate automated tools within established
compliance and supervisory structures. Algorithms can efficiently process
vast amounts of information and draw causal inferences that predict incipient
trends or threats.6 At the same time, automated systems have well-known
weaknesses, including their propensity to homogenize and sterilize controls,
as well as to trigger cascading failures resulting from programming errors,
inadequate training, or the interaction of automated systems.7 When
automated systems rely on structured or unstructured information, operations
and compliance personnel must dedicate time, resources, and judgment to
information management.8 Moreover, automation may subtly undermine
efforts to inculcate a culture of compliance within firms and thereby devalue
the “seat at the table” to which compliance officers have long aspired.9
3. See generally Nathaniel Popper, Stocks & Bots: The Robots Are Coming for Wall Street,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2016, at MM56 (discussing the extent of potential job loss in the financial
industry due to automation); Miles Johnson, How Human Traders Will Beat the Machines, FIN.
TIMES (Jan 25, 2016, 11:11 AM), https://www.ft.com/content/9c3a1b1a-c33f-11e5-b3b1-7b2481
276e45 (discussing the limitations of computers in the financial industry).
4. See, e.g., Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,543 (Sept. 12, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1) (providing
“an overview of the automated trading environment” in the futures and derivatives industry,
“including its principal actors, potential risks, and preventative measures designed to promote safe
and orderly markets”); Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No.
61,358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3596 (Jan. 21, 2010) (conducting “a comprehensive review of equity
market structure” to assess “whether market structure rules have kept pace with, among other things,
changes in trading technology and practices”).
5. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, THECOSTS OFCOMPLIANCE IN THEU.S. SECURITIES INDUSTRY (2006)
[hereinafter SIA 2006 STUDY], https://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/surveys/costofcomp
liancesurveyreport(1).pdf.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.A–C.
8. See infra Part III.D.
9. James A. Fanto, The Vanishing Supervisor, 41 J. CORP. L. 117, 123–24 (2015); see infra
Part III.E.
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To achieve such integration, securities firms (and their regulators) must
therefore temper investment in automation with efforts to augment the
agency of compliance professionals. In essence, compliance personnel must
aspire to see themselves as—and to be seen as—”architects and engineers”
of compliance systems,10 who add value by building stronger relationships
with rank-and-file sales representatives, supervisors, senior business
personnel, and regulators. Part I of this article surveys efforts by federal and
SRO regulators to automate information and surveillance, while Part II
discusses the reasons why such efforts are both constructive and necessary.
Part III discusses, from the perspective of compliance personnel, the
challenges that automation poses in interfacing between the business
imperatives of firms and regulatory compliance. Part IV considers how
investment in the professional development of compliance personnel can
advance regulatory and operational objectives.
I. THE AUTOMATION OF INFORMATION GATHERING
AND SURVEILLANCE
The automation of communications and trading activity has
unquestionably revolutionized financial markets. Exchanges and other
trading venues use state-of-the-art communication networks and
computational power to route and match order flow, while institutional and
proprietary traders have automated the analysis of information, investment
management, the generation of trading interest, and the execution of trading
decisions.11 Firms have also begun to experiment with the automation of
investment advice, such as through automated portfolio reallocation.12 One
may debate the implications of these developments for the fairness and
efficiency of markets, but there seems to be little to stem the tide.13
10. Larry Ribstein, Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305, 316 (2012); see, e.g.,
Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers?: Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of
Law 66–67 (Dec. 30, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701092 (distinguishing the services that legal
software can provide from the values that lawyers “uniquely insure and support,” such as “respect
for the autonomy and dignity of citizens, including their self-defined interests,” the ability to provide
reasons for legal outcomes, “both as a resource for stability and a mechanism for change,” and
“participation in the development and application of law, and its evolution over time”).
11. See, e.g., ONNIG H. DOMBALAGIAN, CHASING THE TAPE 164–66 (2015).
12. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE
(2016), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf (discussing
the advantages and disadvantages of automating the provision of investment advice to retail
customers); Sec’y of State of the Commonwealth of Mass., Sec. Div., Policy Statement: Robo-
Advisers And State Investment Adviser Registration (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/
sct/sctpdf/Policy-Statement—Robo-Advisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf; see
also Melanie Fein, FINRA’s Report on Robo-Advisors: Fiduciary Implications (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2768295.
13. Some commentators suggest that algorithmic trading has the potential to disrupt traditional
securities intermediation, often with negative externalities. Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology
and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1051–52 (2015) (describing how “deep
microstructural changes in twenty-first-century capital markets are transforming the regulatory
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In this environment, policy makers must respond in kind. Regulators
must upgrade their tools not only to monitor markets for fraudulent, unfair,
and unethical conduct, but also to parse new trading practices and strategies
and make educated guesses about their impact on market efficiency and
public price discovery. To this end, regulators are pursuing three basic
strategies. First, regulators have promoted, through automated systems, the
public dissemination of quantitative and qualitative information—such as
news, data feeds, position reports, and other macroeconomic information.
Second, regulators have enhanced recordkeeping and reporting requirements
for market intermediaries in order to capture more information regarding
business conduct and trading activity. Finally, regulators have begun the
process of automating the analysis of these information streams as part of
their surveillance, compliance inspection, and examination functions.
A. ENHANCED INFORMATIONDISSEMINATION
The most prominent regulatory efforts to date involve enhancing the
public dissemination of information by improving the automated
accessibility of public disclosures. These initiatives are intended to benefit
all market participants by making more structured information available to
the public on a fair and nondiscriminatory basis. For example, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has undertaken an initiative to require
reporting companies to make certain financial data available in the eXtensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL),14 and to require sponsors of asset-
backed securities to provide XBRL asset-level or loan-level data “necessary
ecosystem across issue areas” and “changing the incentives for market participants and gatekeepers
in ways that may not always bolster financial stability or investor protection”); Yesha Yadav, How
Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1611
(2015) (arguing that while “algorithms help markets make gains on several measures of
informational efficiency, they also create costs for their ability to allocate capital productively”).
Others argue that automated trading merely reflects the ongoing challenge of managing the role of
information technology in securities markets. See Merritt B. Fox et. al., The New Stock Market:
Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 195–97 (2015) (questioning “the growing furor over the
new stock market” in policy circles and concluding that “no emergency exists requiring immediate,
less-than-fully-considered action”); Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and
Commodity Markets—From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SANDIEGOL. REV. 555, 618 (2015)
(concluding that “the use of high-speed methods for the transmittal of information in order to obtain
an edge on trading over other traders is a practice that is as old as the markets themselves”).
14. See Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 9002, 74
Fed. Reg. 6776 (Feb. 10, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249). When
fully implemented, issuers would tag not only specific line item descriptions and amounts presented
in the firm’s financial statements (whether prepared in accordance with US GAAP or IFRS) but
also significant accounting policies, tables, and other monetary or numerical values in the
accompanying footnotes. The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) is charged with
developing similar technical standards pursuant to the Transparency Directive’s mandate that all
annual financial reports be prepared in a single electronic reporting format by January 1, 2020.
Directive 2013/50/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013. Among
other “current and future technological options,” ESMA is instructed to consider XBRL. Id. at recit.
26.
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for investors to independently perform due diligence” into creditworthiness.15
At the same time, the SEC has encouraged firms to be thoughtful in using
alternative information channels—such as social media—to broadcast
breaking information consistent with principles of fair disclosure.16
Many policy makers have expressed the hope that the availability of
easily retrievable information will encourage participants to make productive
use of it.17 Academics and policy makers may of course use formatted
disclosures to identify trends in sales and trading practices, with a view to
informing further policymaking. For institutional investors, regulatory
standardization may well reduce the cost of information products they
already use; at the same time, their fiduciary obligations often require them
to integrate each new source of information into their operational and
compliance systems regardless of cost or utility.18More ambitious is the hope
that retail investors will benefit from these enhancements, if financial service
providers develop accessible tools that allow investors to manipulate publicly
available data with greater precision.19
15. Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act Release No. 9638, 79
Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,241 (Sept. 24, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243,
249). These disclosures include standardized asset data points for specific asset classes, similar to
the information imperfectly gathered in loan tapes, summarized in spreadsheets, and made available
for (if not actually used by) prospective investors. Id. at 57,246–48.
16. For purposes of the fair disclosure requirement of Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101, the
SEC has advised issuers to consider
whether and when: (1) [a] company web site is a recognized channel of distribution; (2)
posting of information on a company web site disseminates the information in a manner
making it available to the securities marketplace in general; and (3) there has been a
reasonable waiting period for investors and the market to react to the posted information.
Commission Guidance on the Use of Company Web Sites, Exchange Act Release No. 58,288, 73
Fed. Reg. 45,862, 45,867 (Aug. 7, 2008) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 241, 271). Social media channels
with limited distribution—such as a corporate officer’s personal site or feed—may not, for example,
satisfy these criteria. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No. 69,279, 105
SEC Docket 4327 (Apr. 2, 2013).
17. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 303, 318–19 (2008) (questioning the premise of SEC Chairman Levitt’s “plain English”
initiative and Chairman Cox’s interactive data initiatives).
18. Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock Markets,
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273, 290–91 (2007) (noting that federalization of the duty of
best execution has “deprived exchange members and their fiduciary customers of the ability to
control market data prices” because they are “ill-equipped to decline to buy the market data the
exchanges sell”).
19. See, e.g., Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech before the
American Enterprise Institute: The Interactive Data Revolution: Improved Disclosure for Investors,
Less Expensive Reporting for Companies (May 30, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch053006cc.htm.
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B. ENHANCINGDATACOLLECTION FORREPORTING AND
RECORDKEEPING
Other initiatives seek to make more information available and more
easily manipulable for regulatory and compliance purposes. Since 2001, the
SEC has standardized the compilation of detailed transaction information by
SROs for intermarket surveillance purposes.20 The SEC’s proposed
Consolidated Audit Trail would build upon these audit-trail and broker-
dealer recordkeeping requirements—as well as existing quotation and last-
sale reporting mechanisms for equity securities—to permit real-time
surveillance and investigation of order routing, display, and execution.21 The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’s (Dodd-
Frank) mandate to encourage centralized clearance, trade execution, and
public reporting of swaps will likewise require regulators and industry
repositories to capture trading activity and exposure in institutional
derivatives.22 While not all such information will be available to the public,
these reporting and recordkeeping requirements will create a virtual database
for monitoring trading activity.
These efforts have paved the way for even more intrusive data collection.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) proposed
Comprehensive Automated Risk Data System (CARDS), though tabled for
the moment,23 envisioned the collection of account information, account
activity, and security identification information on an automated and regular
basis.24 The new Office of Financial Research (OFR) within the Treasury
Department likewise has broad authority to collect financial transaction data
and position data from financial companies as part of its mandate to monitor
financial stability.25 Moreover, the OFR is authorized to share such data and
20. Annette L. Nazareth & Margaret E. Tahyar, Transparency and Confidentiality in the Post
Financial Crisis World—Where to Strike the Balance?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 145, 158–75 (2011).
21. Commodity and Securities Exchanges, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,808 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at 17
C.F.R. § 242.613 (2016)) (requiring a plan to “govern the creation, implementation, and
maintenance of a consolidated audit trail and central repository”); Notice of Filing of the National
Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 77,724,
81 Fed. Reg. 30,614 (May 17, 2016) (establishing a plan to develop the consolidated audit trail).
22. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified, at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13) (2012)) (requiring both “real-
time public reporting” and reporting to a “registered swap data repository” of certain swap
transaction data); see also id., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(m) (2012) (requiring the same for security-based
swap transaction data).
23. FINRA’s CARDS Plan Dead on Table: Axelrod, THINK ADVISOR (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/11/03/finras-cards-plan-dead-on-table-axelrod.
24. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 13-42 COMPREHENSIVE
AUTOMATEDRISKDATA SYSTEMCONCEPT PROPOSAL (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter CARDSCONCEPT
PROPOSAL]; see also FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 14-37
COMPREHENSIVE AUTOMATED RISK DATA SYSTEM RULE PROPOSAL (Sept. 2014) [hereinafter
CARDS RULE PROPOSAL].
25. Dodd-Frank, §§ 153(a), 154(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5343(a), 5344(b).
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information with individual financial regulators, such as the SEC and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).26
C. DEVELOPINGANALYTIC TOOLS
Equipped with such information flows, regulators are launching several
initiatives to automate analysis of the activities of issuers, markets, and
intermediaries. The SEC’s Accounting Quality Model (AQM) mines
information from issuer filings to assess the degree to which “registrants’
financial statements appear anomalous” in relation to firms within their
industry and the accounting characteristics and approaches they share.27 The
Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS) collects and processes
both public consolidated and proprietary feeds from equity markets, as well
as information from related options and futures markets, to monitor and
analyze market disruptions, reconstruct market events, and anticipate other
trends in trading.28 The CFTC likewise is currently developing a new
electronic trade surveillance system to more efficiently process and analyze
the trade data it collects.29
The SEC has also developed analytic tools to monitor the business
conduct of registered securities intermediaries. The National Exam Analytics
Tool (NEAT) systematically analyzes trading activity with a view to
detecting insider trading, front running, improper investment allocations, and
other kinds of fraudulent or unethical conduct.30 FINRA’s Securities
Observation, News Analysis, and Regulation (SONAR) system similarly
26. 12 U.S.C. § 5343(b)(1).
27. Craig M. Lewis, Chief Economist & Dir., Div. of Risk Strategy & Fin. Innnovation, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech before the Financial Executives International Committee on Finance
and Information Technology: Risk Modeling at the SEC: The Accounting Quality Model (Dec. 13,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491988#.UxoXCPldWSo.
28. Information gathered by MIDAS and relevant studies of market activity are available at
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/midas.html#.WCuNPWVNHww. See, e.g., SEC v. One or
More Unknown Traders in Sec. of Onyx Pharm., Inc., No. 13-CV-4645 JPO, 2014 WL 5026153, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014), reconsideration denied sub nom. SEC v. Jafar, No. 13-CV-4645 JPO,
2015 WL 3604228 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (citing SEC’s use of MIDAS to infer insider trading
activity in the options market by unknown traders). The SEC has suggested that MIDAS could be
further extended to include deeper and broader information beyond exchange data. See Kara M.
Stein, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks before the Securities Traders Association’s
82nd Annual Market Structure Conference: Market Structure in the 21st Century: Bringing Light to
the Dark (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/stein-market-structure.html (noting, in
particular, the need to gather information such as firm attributions, participant IDs, and hidden
orders in dark pools).
29. See, e.g., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-2015
STRATEGY 1.1.1 11 (2011), http://www.cftc.gov/reports/strategicplan/2015/2015strategicplan0702.
html (setting forth Commission’s strategic goal of “develop[ing] automated surveillance systems to
monitor market conditions and trader activity, and develop an alert and case management system to
identify and track potential trading violations”).
30. Mary JoWhite, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address before the 41st Annual
Securities Regulation Institute: The SEC In 2014 (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540677500.
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monitors for anomalous trading activity before major financial
developments.31 FINRA’s CARDS proposal would have likewise “utiliz[ed]
automated analytics on brokerage data to identify problematic sales practice
activity,” such as “churning, excessive commissions, pump and dump
schemes, markups, [and] mutual fund switching.”32
Beyond individual surveillance and enforcement tools, federal financial
regulators actively tout a “reimagining” of the role of disclosures,
information gathering, and analysis in financial markets.33 Within the SEC,
the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) seeks “to integrate
financial economics and rigorous data analytics into the core mission of the
SEC,” with a view to “promoting collaborative efforts throughout the agency
and breaking through silos that might otherwise limit the impact of the
agency’s institutional expertise.”34 DERA is credited with developing many
of the SEC’s new analytic tools in collaboration with enforcement and
surveillance programs in other divisions or offices.35Meanwhile, the OFR is
undertaking the development of a suite of monitoring products to interpret
developments in financial markets and identify vulnerabilities in the financial
system.36
II. THE INEVITABILITY OF AUTOMATED SURVEILLANCE
The automated surveillance of financial markets—and automated
compliance in financial firms—is overdue. Commentators have long
31. Suzanne Barlyn,Wall Street Regulator Tries Its Own Algorithm, WALLST. J. (Dec. 22, 2010,
4:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703814804576035950655394730.
32. CARDS CONCEPT PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 2; see also CARDS RULE PROPOSAL, supra
note 24.
33. See, e.g., Rob Tricchinelli, SEC Should Reimagine Disclosure, Stein Says, BLOOMBERG
BNA (May 16, 2016), http://news.bna.com/sdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=282.
34. About the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXC. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/dera/about (last visited June 30, 2016).
35. See, e.g., Richard Hill, SEC Economic Division Innovating Risk Models, BLOOMBERG BNA
(Feb. 19, 2016), http://news.bna.com/sdln/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=282
(describing DERA initiatives to integrate predictive analytics in its broker-dealer risk-assessment
model, such as “topic modeling” to extract themes from corporate narrative disclosures);
Memorandum from the Risk Strategy Fin. Innovation & Office of the Gen. Counsel to the Staff of
the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Mar. 16, 2012) [hereinafter
Best Practices Memorandum], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_
secrulemaking.pdf (providing best practices for using DERA in SEC rulemaking); Press Release,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Multiple Hedge Fund Managers With Fraud in Inquiry
Targeting Suspicious Investment Returns (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-252.htm (outlining actions brought against hedge fund managers using DERA tools); Use of
Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development Companies, 80 Fed.
Reg. 80,883, 80,892 (Dec. 28, 2015) (using data procured by DERA to create SEC rules); Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Creation of New Office Within its Division
of Economic and Risk Analysis (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370542914800 (outlining the traditional role and new responsibilities of DERA).
36. See OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 9–18 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS], https://financialresearch.gov/annual-reports/
files/office-of-financial-research-annual-report-2015.pdf.
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criticized Congress and federal market regulators for their reactive posture
toward market regulation, particularly in contrast with federal banking
regulators, who take a more collaborative (albeit resource-intensive)
approach to monitoring the activities of financial firms.37 Such critics have
urged the SEC and other business-conduct regulators to marshal empirical
analysis in order to identify marketplace risks for financial transactions and
services and to focus on preventative measures, rather than rely on
“regulation by enforcement” and its inevitable evidentiary and distributive
implications.38 Moreover, as regulatory requirements proliferate and the
complexity of financial services deepens, automated surveillance may be the
only effective means of performing the kind of oversight necessary to
advance these goals.
A. THE NEED FOR REAL-TIME REGULATION
The chief virtue of automation is its ability to collect and process
information in real time.39 Automated surveillance can observe patterns of
routing and execution behavior with a view to detecting and preventing
violations, rather than assembling and interpreting information after the fact
as part of a civil or administrative proceeding. Indeed, exchanges and other
trading venues have long used automated technology to monitor their trading
facilities both for operational and regulatory purposes.40 As the number of
trading venues has increased in recent years, trading activity that involves
execution or routing across multiple venues has become increasingly difficult
to monitor. Accordingly, regulators have adopted rules to standardize
37. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Katz, Reviewing the SEC, Reinvigorating the SEC, 71 U. PITT. L. REV.
489, 489–96 (2010) (noting the historical context of inadequate SEC surveillance); John I. Sanders,
Spoofing: A Proposal for Normalizing Divergent Securities and Commodities Futures Regimes, 51
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 517, 528–29 (2016) (discussing the SEC’s reliance on dated enforcement
authority to combat modern issues in financial regulation); Nathaniel E. Sokol, High Frequency
Litigation: SEC Responses to High Frequency Trading as a Case Study in Misplaced Regulatory
Priorities, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 402, 452–54 (2016) (discussing the “glacial pace” at
which SEC advancements occur); Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional
Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1441–42 (noting the misplaced priorities of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
38. See Katz, supra note 37.
39. Of course, regulators have long experience with adapting regulatory methods to deal with
advances in communications technology. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 13, at 567–601 (discussing
the history of the quest for technological advantages in financial markets).
40. The efficacy of SRO surveillance may nevertheless be bounded by jurisdictional limitations,
commercial incentives to maximizing listing and trading volume revenue, and the conflicting
interests of their members or principal trading participants. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Howell E.
Jackson,Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2007) (noting the limits
of SRO independence); Ernest E. Bradway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-
Regulation as We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1354–56 (2005) (offering examples of
limitations placed on SRO independence); Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-
Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation,
62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 480–83 (1984) (discussing the limits placed on the SEC by the Securities
Exchange Act).
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monitoring and recordkeeping within individual markets, and to build
marketwide surveillance systems that use standardized information to track
trading activity across exchanges and other trading systems.41
Regulators have also shifted resources to real-time regulation as concerns
mount over market disruptions, operational integrity, and systemic risk. Real-
time monitoring of trading activity is critical to timely deploying of circuit
breakers, calibrating trading facilities and proprietary market-making
systems, and taking other prophylactic measures in the face of trading errors,
algorithmic snafus, or temporary imbalances in supply or demand.42 To
anticipate market disruptions caused by systems failures and other threats to
the operational stability and integrity of markets, regulators must also be able
to identify weaknesses in communications of trading systems or contagion
across markets.43 To monitor financial stability, regulators must be able to
gather and analyze information from an even broader range of sources in
order to identify conditions that may forewarn economic shock or the
cascading failure of institutions.44
As regulators heighten real-time monitoring, individual firms must
follow through with real-time operational and compliance controls as well.
Automated compliance controls can trigger the kind of warnings about
market and credit risk that may escape the notice of human supervisors. For
example, capital adequacy rules—which ensure that financially troubled
firms may be liquidated in an orderly manner—generally apply on a
“moment-to-moment” basis.45 Similarly, liquidity provision by market
makers is increasingly driven by algorithms that rely on real-time data.46
Moreover, without real-time compliance systems, it would be difficult for
firms and their correspondents to detect, prevent, and effectively remediate
trading patterns that could not only result in intraday violations, but lead to
potentially catastrophic consequences for the firm and the market.47
41. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 11, at 155–59.
42. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010: REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND
SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES 6–8 (2010)
[hereinafter FLASHCRASHREPORT].
43. See, e.g., Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release No. 69,077,
78 Fed. Reg. 18,084, 18,090–91 (Mar. 25, 2013).
44. See, e.g., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 36, at 9–12 (outlining the tools
the OFR uses to monitor the markets).
45. See sources cited infra note 65; see also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers,
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a) (2016) (providing that “[e]very broker or dealer must at all times have
and maintain” its minimum required net capital under the rule).
46. FLASHCRASH REPORT, supra note 42, at 39.
47. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Knight Capital Says Trading Glitch Cost It $440 Million, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2012, 4:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/knight-capital-says-
trading-mishap-cost-it-440-million/ (providing an overview of the effects of the Knight Capital
crash); Jenny Strasburg & Jacob Bunge, Loss Swamps Trading Firm, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2012,
8:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443866404577564772083961412
(discussing the fallout of the Knight Capital crash).
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B. A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS TO PROPHYLACTICREGULATION
Several former SEC commissioners and officials have also questioned
whether the current enforcement model of regulation serves the goal of
investor protection.48 Upholding standards of business conduct—such as
suitability or fiduciary standards, order handling requirements, or guidance
on markups and commissions—requires detailed supervision of customer
accounts, communications, and proprietary trading activity.49 Because
securities regulators have lacked the financial resources to engage in ongoing
supervision of firms, they have traditionally relied on civil and administrative
proceedings, as well as private litigation and arbitration, to enforce their rules
after the fact.50 As a consequence, firms themselves have borne the expense
of maintaining supervisory hierarchies and internal compliance controls to
ensure adherence to business conduct standards.51
This “regulation by enforcement” model, however, has notable flaws.
First, overreliance on after-the-fact enforcement, rather than prevention, may
disproportionately affect smaller firms. Stavros Gadinis’s study of broker-
dealer enforcement actions prior to the recent financial crisis, for example,
reinforces the perception that larger firms are much less likely than smaller
firms to face enforcement actions, liability for individual principals and
associated persons, and potent sanctions by virtue of their superior defensive
resources.52 Second, it may create perverse incentives for enforcement
personnel. Urska Velikronja’s study of securities enforcement actions
48. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First
Century, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 323 (2008) (arguing that “[i]t is more effective to induce
compliance with law in the first instance than to utilize the club of enforcement after the fact to
punish those who have violated the law”); Katz, supra note 37, at 500–10 (advocating the use of
empirical analysis and “forward-looking” regulation in lieu of traditional enforcement approaches);
Steven M.H. Wallman, Commentary on Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 825, 827 n.4 (2009) (observing that “too much of FINRA’s effort focuses on
enforcement that results in fine-generating activities that have only a modest connection to real
investor protection”).
49. The SEC traditionally has not enjoyed the authority to adopt ethical or business conduct
standards for broker-dealers, certain registration, examination, and financial responsibility
requirements. As a result, it has largely left that task to SROs, while adopting certain baseline
standards of conduct through its antifraud enforcement authority. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser,
Reflections on the Securities Broker as a Fiduciary, 68 SMU L. REV. 845, 850 (2015). In recent
years, however, Congress has expanded the SEC’s authority in this regard. See, e.g., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, (Exchange Act), Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(k)(1), 80b-11(g) (2012)) (conferring authority to promulgate a
uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and investment advisers in connection with
“personalized investment advice about securities to a retail customer”).
50. Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1941 (2012)
(noting the effect of a lack of resources on regulatory decision making); but see, e.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does The Treasury Have A Better Idea?, 95 VA. L.
REV. 707, 728–29 (2009) (attributing the SEC’s strong tradition of enforcement to “higher level of
individual ownership” and “deep-seated Populist skepticism of Wall Street”).
51. Katz, supra note 37, at 510.
52. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 701 (2012).
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suggests that the SEC has increasingly sought to plump its enforcement
statistics by “double- or triple-count[ing]” enforcement violations, inflating
penalties, and favoring “easier-to-prosecute strict-liability violations.”53
FINRA’s disciplinary actions display similar trends.54
By contrast, an automated system of regulatory supervision—coupled
with more flexible use of cease-and-desist tools—may ensure more uniform
application of rules. SEC and SRO examinations often focus on selected
priorities—in the form of “sweep exams” targeted at specific conduct or
relating to a specific rule55—while relying on relatively infrequent
examinations, self-reporting by firms, and tips for more routine matters.
Moreover, even when violations are established, the time and resources
necessary to investigate and litigate a criminal, civil, or disciplinary
proceeding may frustrate efforts to remediate investor harm.56
Perhaps most importantly, the securities industry and the federal courts
have forced securities regulators toward a more data-driven approach to
prophylactic regulation.57 In recent years, industry advocates have persuaded
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to impose the equivalent of a
cost-benefit analysis on SEC and CFTC rulemaking.58 Having challenged the
53. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 933–39 (2016).
54. Jean Eaglesham, Finra Weighs Tougher Stance, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2014, 10:56 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-watchdog-finra-under-pressure-to-toughen-sanctions-140
3219509 (discussing the disparity between FINRA enforcement actions and the total sanctions as a
result of those actions).
55. Bruce M. Bettigole & Shanyn L. Gillespie, “Defending Clients in Financial Regulatory
Authority Investigations,” § 10:8, in DANIEL J. FETTERMAN ANDMARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING
CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS (2014-2015) (discussing the
use of sweeps in FINRA investigations); see, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS & EXAMINATIONS, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2016,
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2016.pdf; Letter
from Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., 2016
Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.finra.org/industry/2016-
regulatory-and-examination-priorities-letter. See also Urska Velikonja, Politics in Securities
Enforcement, 50 GA. L. REV. 17, 31 (2015) (discussing the SEC’s use of sweep exams).
56. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF
FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME NO. OIG-509 (2009),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL, INVESTIGATION OF THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO CONCERNS REGARDING
ROBERT ALLEN STANFORD’S ALLEGED PONZI SCHEME NO. OIG-526 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf.
57. See Alan Schwartz, Regulating for Rationality, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1409–10 (2015)
(arguing that regulators ought to seek “evidence of how actual consumers behave”—such as “survey
data, field tests, or experiments”—when attempting to distinguish “rational from irrational
contracting choices” through regulation).
58. See, e.g., Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 178–79 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(holding the SEC’s analysis of the effect of a proposed rule on efficiency, competition, and capital
formation was arbitrary and capricious); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144–45
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding the SEC failed to adequately consider the costs of proposed legislation);
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding the SEC framed the cost-
benefit analysis of a proposed rule inconsistently and failed to adequately quantify costs). In the
2016] Preserving Human Agency In Automated Compliance 83
SEC to make an empirical case for regulatory initiatives, the industry has all
but invited the SEC and FINRA to deploy data-gathering and analytic tools
to monitor issuer disclosure, account management, and trading practices.59
Moreover, once these troves of data are available, regulators can mine them
to detect, prevent, and sanction violations of rules otherwise rarely enforced
or difficult to enforce.60
As a result, firms must also invest in technological approaches to deter
or detect potential violations, in order to avoid triggering federal or SRO
monitoring systems. For example, various financial institutions already use
surveillance software to monitor the message traffic of their traders for
purposes of detecting potentially unlawful trading activity.61 Such systems
may eventually evolve “to monitor all employee behavior [and] catch
breaches of conduct rules.”62 Such systems of course remain in their infancy;
compliance and supervisory personnel must still sift through flagged
documents and exception reports to sort out false positives. Nevertheless, the
effective integration of such compliance tools into human supervisory
activity is unavoidable.
C. EXPANDING SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF COMPLIANCE
OBLIGATIONS
The proliferation and increasing complexity of compliance mandates
also require increasing automation of core compliance functions. Industry
studies of the cost of compliance often lament the incremental costs of
additional reporting, recordkeeping, and other internal controls imposed on
public companies, their auditors, and securities intermediaries in the wake of
successive scandals.63 Dodd-Frank has only intensified this pressure by
wake of these challenges, the SEC has adopted guidelines for cost-benefit analysis. See Best
Practices Memorandum, supra note 35.
59. See, e.g., Joshua T. White, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 50
GA. L. REV. 293, 320–22 (2015) (detailing DERA’s economic analysis of the SEC’s risk retention
regulatory proposal).
60. See, e.g., Consolidated Audit Trail, Exchange Act Release No. 67,457, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,722,
45,737 n.127 (Aug. 1, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (noting concerns of commenters “about
the costs of implementing a consolidated audit trail relative to the benefits to be gained,” particularly
insofar as it could be designed to detect violations such as frontrunning, spoofing, and layering).
61. John Detrixhe, Robots Reading Trader Chats to Stop Next Wave of Bank Fines, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (Feb. 23, 2016, 9:04 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-23/robots-are-
reading-trader-chats-to-stop-next-wave-of-bank-fines.
62. See, e.g., Jeffrey Voegeli, Credit Suisse, CIA-Funded Palantir to Target Rogue Bankers,
BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 22, 2016, 12:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-22/
credit-suisse-cia-funded-palantir-build-joint-compliance-firm (discussing Signac, a Credit Suisse
joint venture focused on detecting unauthorized trading within the firm).
63. See, e.g., SIA 2006 STUDY, supra note 5, at 5–7; Susan Lorde Martin, Compliance Officers:
More Jobs, More Responsibility, More Liability, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 169,
181–83 (2015) (discussing the drastic increase in size of corporate compliance departments in the
financial services industry); U.S. House of Representatives Comm. Fin. Servs., Dodd-Frank Burden
Tracker (2016), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/dodd-frank_pra_spreadsheet_7-9-
2012.pdf [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Burden Tracker] (providing data on the amount of hours of labor
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introducing punishing new workloads for both regulators and compliance
personnel.64
At the same time, the disintermediation and fragmentation of financial
markets will compound the need for business and compliance personnel to
scale up their diligence obligations. Gone are the days when broker-dealers
satisfied their best-execution obligations by collecting three quotations: when
margin requirements were calculated on the basis of simple trading strategies,
when credit risk was determined based on nationally recognized statistical
rating organization (NRSRO) ratings, or when market making consisted of
posting continuous two-sided quotes. Today, rules and standards for the
conduct of financial services are increasingly defined by algorithms that
monitor order-execution conditions, portfolio valuation, creditworthiness of
issuers, and market liquidity.65
As standards of care and loyalty are heightened,moreover, “fair dealing”
in complex financial transactions may require disclosures and other
communications that are increasingly user-driven.66 For example, dealers and
major participants in certain swap transactions must provide counterparties
with scenario analyses describing the performance of certain bilateral swaps
on request.67 More ambitiously, the SEC proposed (but did not adopt) a
requirement for sponsors of asset-backed securities offerings to “file,” as part
needed to meet the requirements imposed by Dodd-Frank); see also Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement: Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml
(reporting progress on rulemaking, studies, and other actions required of the SEC under the Act).
64. Dodd-Frank Burden Tracker, supra note 63 (providing data on the burdens imposed by
Dodd-Frank).
65. See, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Wholesaling Best Execution: How Entangled Are Off-
Exchange Market Makers?, VA. L. & BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing best-execution
practices of market-makers); Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 71,194, 79 Fed. Reg. 1522, 1526–1527 (Jan. 8,
2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (noting that “moment-to-moment” net capital compliance
requires firms to adopt credit analysis processes “designed to ensure that its credit determinations
are current, and address the frequency with which the broker-dealer reviews and reassesses its credit
determinations”).
66. Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 11, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-10 (2012)); 7 U.S.C. § 6s; see also Gregory Scopino, Regulating Fairness: The Dodd-Frank
Act’s Fair Dealing Requirement for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 93 NEB. L. REV.
31, 39 (2014) (offering an “in-depth analysis of the Dodd-Frank Act’s fair dealing mandate for swap
entities”).
67. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 77 Fed. Reg. 9822 (2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 23.431 (2016)) (requiring CFTC-regulated swap dealers to provide a scenario analysis, upon
request, to certain counterparties prior to entering into swaps not available for trading on an
exchange or swap execution facility). The SEC has not adopted a requirement that security-based
swap professionals provide a scenario analysis to counterparties on request as part of their obligation
“to disclose the material risks and characteristics of the particular security-based swap” under
Exchange Act Rule 15Fh–3(b)(1). 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fh-3(b)(1). Nevertheless, the SEC has
observed that nothing prohibits a counterparty from requesting such an analysis. Business Conduct
Standards for Security-Based SwapDealers andMajor Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange
Act Release No. 77,617, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,960, 29,983–85 (May 13, 2016) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240).
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of the registration statement, a waterfall computer program to facilitate
analysis of the flow of funds.68 To satisfy these standards, firms must develop
tools to generate disclosures and responses to requests for information on
demand.
III. STRIKING THE BALANCE
While the business imperative for automating compliance and
supervisory functions may be clear, human beings cannot be entirely
removed from the equation. As long as investing remains “an emotional
process”—in which human beings provide investors with the “comfort and
encouragement” necessary to embark upon and maintain a financial plan that
meets important life events69—only human beings can anticipate and develop
strategies to prevent exploitation of the cognitive biases that pervade human
decision-making.70 Firms, however, are not insensitive to the advantages of
further automating compliance; personnel costs consume the vast majority of
compliance budgets despite increases in information technology and other
capital expenditures.71More importantly, business personnel lament that they
spend a significant share of their time dealing with supervisory and
compliance issues, when they would rather be developing new business.72
Investing further resources in technology, however, comes with
drawbacks of its own. Excessive reliance on automated compliance systems
may result in undue homogenization and sterilization of compliance practices
across firms and could impair responsiveness to emerging threats.
Automation of external surveillance and internal compliance also requires
compliance and business personnel to make hard choices about how
information is collected, maintained, and shared. From a cultural perspective,
automated surveillance also threatens to erode much of the effort by
regulators and firms to inculcate a culture of compliance among rank-and-
file employees.
68. Asset-Backed Securities, Securities Act Release No. 9117, 75 Fed. Reg. 23,328 (May 3,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 243, 249) (proposing release). Such
a program would have provided users with the “ability to programmatically input the user’s own
assumptions regarding the future performance and cash flows from the pool assets, including but
not limited to assumptions about future interest rates, default rates, prepayment speeds, loss-given-
default rates, and any other necessary assumptions” in order to generate, as output, the resulting
cash flows under those assumptions. Id. at 23,378.
69. Andrew W. Lo, Imagine if Robo Advisers Could Do Emotions, WALL ST. J. THE EXPERTS
(June 6, 2016, 6:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2016/06/06/the-one-ability-robo-advisers-
are-still-missing/.
70. Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 635 (1996)
(discussing these cognitive biases).
71. SIA 2006 STUDY, supra note 5, at 29.
72. Id. at 30.
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A. HOMOGENIZATION OF COMPLIANCE PRACTICES
One of the principal risks of automated surveillance is that it will result
in an unhealthy homogeneity in compliance practices across firms. To the
extent that compliance systems must be built to meet the specifications
established by regulators or industry standards, automated surveillance and
compliance practices run the risk of one-size-fits-all monitoring that fails to
take into account the scale or size of a firm’s operations or trading activity.
Because automation may thereby frustrate the discretion of compliance
personnel to “act on their own judgments of what ought to be done,” the
functional limitation of automated systems may come to be viewed as a
normative limitation on the role of compliance.73
For example, the SEC’s dissemination standards will constrain the
manner in which issuer disclosures are produced and the related
responsibilities of capital markets professionals and participants. XBRL
tagging may enable professional traders, retail investors, and regulators to
manipulate information more cheaply and effectively. At the same time,
though, if institutional investors and analysts displace traditional comparable
company analysis with automated strategies, XBRL formatting standards
will effectively dictate how issuer information is parsed. For example,
issuers’ flexibility to exploit the innate extensibility of XBRL tagging might
either facilitate or frustrate comparability, depending on the range of
adequate, affordable, and customized software products and the SEC’s
efforts at monitoring, cataloging, and guiding extension use.74
Similarly, automation may not mesh well with ongoing efforts to
heighten normative standards of conduct if regulators and compliance
personnel try to mimic the application of standards with excessively granular
data points or rules.75 Automated systems still lack the intuition to identify
what information is required to achieve the best outcome for a customer and
73. Roger Brownsword, Lost in Translation: Legality, Regulatory Margins, and Technological
Management, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1321, 1324 (2011) (noting that in a shift “from a traditional
legal order to a technologically managed order,” the semantics of “ought and ought not becomes
can and cannot”).
74. Interactive Data to Improve Financial Reporting, Securities Act Release No. 9002, 74 Fed.
Reg. 6776, 6783–84 (Feb. 10, 2009) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249); see
also Letter from the Disclosure Effectiveness Working Grp. of the Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm.
and the Law & Accounting Comm. of the Am. Bar Ass’n to the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Feb.
15, 2016) (noting issuers’ concerns regarding the time-consuming XBRL tagging process “versus
its perceived utility for investors”). Commenters expressed similar reservations about locking in the
use of a particular technical standards or programming in connection with the SEC’s proposal to
mandate Python under Regulation AB in light of the upfront cost of implementation and the
uncertainty as to their utility. Asset-Backed Securities Disclosure and Registration, Securities Act
Release No. 9638, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,184, 57,191 (Sept. 24, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229,
230, 232, 239, 240, 243, 249) (adopting release) (noting decision not to adopt this requirement).
75. For example, it is not difficult to imagine an automated protocol for comparing information
about a customer’s financial situation and stated preferences against a schedule of investments
marketed by the firm to evaluate whether the sales representative has complied with a suitability
requirement.
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how to extract it. Such weaknesses are compounded when regulators seek to
define by rule the customer-level or transaction-level data to be captured by
compliance systems,76 and thereby eliminate the flexibility of firms to
experiment with competing implementations of suitability standards.
B. STERILIZATION OFCOMPLIANCE PRACTICES
Once implemented, it may be difficult to upgrade automated surveillance
or compliance systems on a regular basis to reflect changing market practices
or conditions. Regulators, of course, take pains to disavow any kind of
predictability with respect to regulatory standards; stress tests, circuit
breakers, operational war games, and algorithms that search for anomalous
market behavior must constantly be recalibrated to avoid reverse-engineering
by regulated entities.77 Moreover, even if materiality or fiduciary standards
are primarily enforced through algorithmic detection, regulators reflexively
reaffirm that such standards cannot be defined by quantitative means alone.78
Enforcement personnel will continue to rely on customer complaints,
whistleblowers, tips from competitors, and other sources of information to
bring novel or unusual claims.
Not all firms, however, can replicate the resources or network of
information available to regulators or larger firms. As a result, they remain at
the mercy of the systems they can afford. Because of the frequent rush of
mandates and implementation timeframes, firms may deploy new
surveillance software without fully considering how to integrate it into their
supervisory and business practices.79 For smaller firms in particular, off-the-
shelf third-party software may be the only way to adapt to new and complex
regulatory requirements; compliance personnel thus may become minders
rather than developers of automated systems and fail to appreciate how
compliance mandates may affect their systems.80 Moreover, because third-
party software vendors are not necessarily responsible to regulators for the
76. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.1125(d)–(e) (2016) (enumerating asset-level data points related to
the property and to the obligor associated with mortgages underlying mortgage-backed securities);
see also CARDS RULE PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 9.
77. See, e.g., Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1283–88
(2014) (discussing the design and implementation of stress testing by bank regulators under Dodd-
Frank); Bradley Hope & Dan Strumpf, The Problem with Circuit Breakers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7,
2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-with-circuit-breakers-1452205576
(discussing the design and implementation of circuit breakers).
78. Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 211) (reminding issuers and auditors that “exclusive reliance on [a 5%] or any
percentage or numerical threshold” for materiality determinations “has no basis in the accounting
literature or the law”).
79. David Tilkin, The Landscape of Broker-Dealer Compliance and Exception Reporting
Systems, 17 PIABA B.J. 65 (2010).
80. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTHORITY, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-14 THIRD
PARTY SERVICEPROVIDERS (March 2011) (requiring comment on proposed rule to clarify the scope
of a firm’s obligations and supervisory responsibilities for functions or activities outsourced to a
third-party service provider).
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quality of their product, there is a risk that compliance software may be ill-
adapted to the needs of individual firms.81
There is also a risk that firms will pare down financial services as
necessary to automate judgment, rather than adapt systems to accommodate
product or service innovation. “Best interest” standards may be difficult to
implement through automated systems that are not able to intuit conflicts of
interest beyond their programming. As a result, firms may prefer (rightly or
wrongly) to confine sales to a limited range of products that pose no conflicts
rather than to encourage thoughtful advice.82 Some “fintech” firms may seek
to avoid broker-dealer or investment-adviser registration altogether by
designing systems that provide limited ministerial services—leaving
investors to their own devices to use them judiciously.83
C. OVERCOMINGAUTOMATIONANXIETY
Automated trading and compliance may heighten the anxiety supervisory
and compliance personnel already experience in anticipating and preventing
regulatory violations. Legal and ethical commentators regularly debate the
implications of ceding agency to algorithms and whether automated agents
are legally competent to engage in such conduct,84 particularly when
automated agents cannot be held “responsible” for transcending their
programming or for design flaws that imperil the viability of the firms that
use them.85 As with other front-line agents, the law therefore places a burden
of supervision on specific human agents within the corporate hierarchy.86 As
a result, supervisory and compliance personnel may be held increasingly
liable for failures to detect and prevent algorithmic malfeasance or
misfeasance.
81. See, e.g., Michael Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time
Finally Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 428 (2008) (discussing strategies used by vendors to avoid tort
liability for insecure or defective software).
82. For example, brokerage and advisory firms may increasingly waive 12b-1 fees for mutual
fund sales to comply with “best interests” standards. Jason Zweig, Mutual Fund Fees: A Bad
Incentive Fades Away, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2016, 10:25 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/
2016/02/26/mutual-fund-fees-a-bad-incentive-fades-away/.
83. See, e.g., Robert Rosenblum et al., 5 of the Most Critical Securities Law Questions Facing
FinTech Companies, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/fin
tech-0316.pdf.
84. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1245 (1992) (analyzing difficulty in holding artificial intelligences morally responsible).
85. See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 13, at 1668; Dan Olds, How One Bad Algorithm Cost Traders
$440 M, THE REGISTER (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:32), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/08/03/bad_algo
rithm_lost_440_million_dollars/.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012) (authorizing the SEC to sanction any person who “has failed
reasonably to supervise . . . another person who commits” a violation of federal securities law);
FINRA RULE 3110 (requiring member firms to “establish and maintain a system to supervise the
activities of each associated person that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with
applicable securities laws and regulations, and with applicable FINRA rules”).
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1. Internal Threats
Traders and their supervisors may find it difficult to develop and
maintain human intuition in trading as order routing and execution decisions
are increasingly made by algorithms. As trading decisions are automated,
price discovery increasingly takes place within a very short window
surrounding periodic and episodic disclosures that is only accessible to
technologically well-equipped investors.87 Some have already expressed
concern that, as a result of the proliferation of trading algorithms, traders are
“gradually los[ing] the instincts and tacit knowledge developed in floor-
based trading.”88 Such knowledge nevertheless becomes critical when
automated systems require human intervention to resume normal operation
after market disruption—a process that can take from “as short as a few
seconds to as long as several hours” for human beings to detect, assess, and
unravel.89
Compliance personnel are by definition even further removed from the
business of trading and therefore need to take extra care to understand and
evaluate the effectiveness of automated compliance programs in the face of
both routine and novel trading strategies. Human traders and their supervisors
may erroneously believe that automated compliance systems ensure full
compliance with business conduct standards, thereby relieving them of the
obligation to verify compliance independently.90 Reflexive reliance on
automated trading and monitoring may thus allow errors in programming or
87. Joung W. Kim et al., The Effect of Mandatory XBRL Reporting across the Financial
Information Environment: Evidence in the First Waves of Mandated U.S. Filers, J. INFO. SYS.,
Spring 2012, at 127 (finding “an increase in information efficiency, a decrease in event return
volatility, and a reduction of change in stock returns volatility” in the post-XBRL disclosure of
sampled firms); Elizabeth Blankespoor et al., Initial Evidence on the Market Impact of the XBRL
Mandate, 20 REV. ACCT. STUDS. 1468, 1471 (2015) (finding wider abnormal bid–ask spreads, a
reduction in abnormal liquidity, and a decrease in abnormal trading volume, particularly for small
trades, in the market immediately following the introduction of XBRL tagging and concluding that
these developments may reflect retail investors’ heightened fears of adverse selection).
88. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., LONDON, FORESIGHT: THE FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS 83 (2012) [hereinafter FUTURE OF COMPUTER TRADING], http://www.cftc.
gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/tacfuturecomputertrading1012.pdf.
89. Id. at 38.
90. See, e.g., In re Goldman Sachs & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 76,899, 2016 WL 159331
(Jan. 14, 2016) (imposing remedial sanctions and a cease-and-desist order against respondent firm
on the grounds that Goldman securities lending desk personnel used a faulty “fill from autolocate”
function to handle approximately 98% of “locate” requests under Regulation SHO, relying “on their
general belief that Goldman’s automated model was conservative,” without “check[ing] alternative
sources of securities or perform[ing] a meaningful further review”); FINRA Letter of Acceptance,
Waiver and Consent, Metlife Securities Inc., No. 2014040870001 (May 3, 2016) (consenting to
sanctions for supervisory failures associated with the understatement of death benefits in connection
with tens of thousands of hypothetical variable annuity replacement transaction disclosures due to
a faulty calculation function that had not been tested for 12 years); Aruna Viswanatha et al., Wall
Street Firms under Investigation for Treatment of Retail Investors, WALLST. J. (May 10, 2016, 7:02
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-firms-under-investigation-for-treatment-of-retail-inv
estors-1462906454 (discussing federal and New York state criminal investigations into the order
handling practices of retail orders by electronic market makers).
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inputs to generate thousands of violations before detection.91 In these cases,
firms may be charged with violating their obligation to implement or
administer compliance programs.92
A similar concern may arise with respect to the automation of diligence.
The financial science behind some products or trading strategies may not be
sufficiently developed for parties or regulators to appreciate and manage the
variety of known and unknown risks entailed.93 Humans may come to rely
excessively on models—particularly when such models serve a particular
business strategy—despite their known weaknesses, simplifying
assumptions, and limited track records.94 Contextual disclosures may also
become increasingly irrelevant in a world of automated analysis.95Moreover,
financial products with untested structures may pose legal risks and agency
costs. Complex legal and accounting structures, for example, exacerbate the
91. See, e.g., In reAXARosenberg Grp. LLC et al., Securities Act Release No. 9181, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3149, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,574, 2011 WL 334789
(Feb. 3, 2011) (censuring the firm and several affiliates after the firm delayed disclosure and failed
to accurately account for a material error in computer code used in its quantitative investment model
for managing client accounts); In re Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 75,729,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4178, 2015 WL 4931787 (Aug. 19, 2015) (censuring the firm
because its automated trade review processes failed to monitor certain principal trades and therefore
failed to enforce rules against principal trading with advisory clients); see also In reBarclays Capital
Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 73,183, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3929, 2014 WL
4702595 (Sept. 23, 2014); see Jeffrey S. Puretz & Kimberly A. Church, Compliance Rules as a New
Enforcement Regime, ALI-CLE Course Materials (SX003 ALI-CLE 159) (2015) (discussing these
and other recent cases brought under the SEC’s new Compliance Rule for investment advisers).
92. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2016) (requiring registered investment companies to adopt
certain compliance practices); Puretz & Church, supra note 91 (discussing the application of Rule
38a-1 to the cases discussed in note 91 supra).
93. FINRA has adopted a registration requirement for algorithmic developers with a view to
ensuring jurisdiction over “associated persons that possesses knowledge of, and responsibility for,
both the design of the intended trading strategy and the technological implementation of the
strategy, sufficient to evaluate whether the resulting product is designed to achieve regulatory
compliance in addition to business objectives.” Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Require
Registration as Securities Traders of Associated Persons, Exchange Act Release No. 77,551, 81
Fed. Reg. 21,914, 21,914–16 (Apr. 13, 2016) (approving rule change requiring registration as
“securities traders” of “associated persons who are (i) primarily responsible for the design,
development or significant modification of algorithmic trading strategies, or (ii) responsible for the
day-to-day supervision or direction of such activities”). Regulation Automated Trading, 80 Fed.
Reg. 78,824, 78,847–48 (Dec. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 38, 40) (proposing to
require certain algorithmic traders to maintain “a source code repository to manage source code
access, persistence, copies of production code, and changes to production code”).
94. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation
to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 180 (2009) (citing evidence
that risk and pricing models are often selected “to justify predetermined business strategies” rather
than “based on their accuracy in measuring risk”).
95. Accountants and regulators, for example, must consider how to assess the material accuracy
of line item disclosures severed from the footnotes and other narrative discussion that qualify their
presentation. See, e.g., Jon Bartley et al., A Comparison of XBRL Filings to Corporate 10-Ks—
Evidence from the Voluntary Filing Program, ACCT. HORIZONS, June 2011, at 232; J. Efrim Boritz
& Won Gyun No, The SEC’s XBRL Voluntary Filing Program on EDGAR: A Case for Quality
Assurance, CURRENT ISSUES INAUDITING, Dec. 2008, at A4.
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cost of monitoring or insuring against the failure of intermediaries in the
production chain.96
2. External Threats
The interaction of trading systems across firms can also pose
undetectable threats to the stability of financial markets. Virtually all market
centers and trading systems have responded to concerns about the impact of
automated trading by fine-tuning circuit breakers and other types of trading
pauses or trading halts to manage periods of high volatility.97 Policy makers
nevertheless struggle to develop protocols for uniform imposition of circuit
breakers across jurisdictions and across related financial products,
particularly when benchmarks or other triggers are vulnerable to
manipulation.98 Moreover, trading halts can trap investors in unwanted,
unhedged positions, thus forcing traders to liquidate unrelated positions and
spreading the impact of the event to otherwise unrelated markets.99
Efforts by individual firms to protect themselves or their clients against
such external threats—for example, by adopting “kill switches” or other
devices to shut off trading activity—may nevertheless result in cascading
market disruptions.100 For example, the trading and compliance systems of
proprietary trading firms continuously screen market information for large,
96. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1492 (1993); Frank Partnoy
& David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1032
(2007); INST. OF INT’L FIN., FINAL REPORT OF THE IIF COMMITTEE ON MARKET BASED
PRACTICES: PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS 49–50, A1–A3
(2008) (describing the agency cost problems inherent in the “originate-to-distribute” model of
mortgage underwriting).
97. Following the Flash Crash, the SEC approved proposed rule changes by the exchanges and
FINRA that modified existing circuit breaker procedures related to market-wide trading halts and
instituted a new “limit up–limit down” mechanism to address market volatility. See, e.g., Order
Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Changes as Modified by Amendments No. 1,
Relating to Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility, Exchange Act Release No.
67,090, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,531 (June 6, 2012); see also Concept Release on Risk Controls and System
Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,547 (Sept. 12, 2013)
(codifed at 17 C.F.R. ch. I).
98. See, e.g., Nina Mehta, NYSE Plans to End LRP Curbs as New Circuit Breakers Enacted,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Apr. 2, 2013, 7:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-
02/nyse-plans-to-end-lrp-curbs-before-new-circuit-breakers-enacted (noting the NYSE’s
objections to eliminating its systems to slow trading at designated “liquidity replenishment points”
so as not to interfere with intermarket circuit breakers). Benchmark-triggered circuit breakers can
lead traders to trade more aggressively in anticipation of a halt or to trade unrelated instruments in
the wake of a halt, which would jeopardize the integrity of the benchmark itself. For this reason
some exchanges do not disclose the trigger points at which circuit breakers intervene. Id.
99. FUTURE OFCOMPUTER TRADING, supra note 88, at 103–05.
100. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. at 56,557. The interaction of such mechanisms could nevertheless pose
unanticipated problems.
92 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
rapid price moves or discrepancies among multiple data sources.101 In
response to negative signals, their systems may trigger automated stops or
“data-integrity pauses” to protect against the risk of ex-post cancellation of
erroneous orders.102 Such acts in the name of self-preservation may
nevertheless contribute to marketwide imbalances.
The SEC’s Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Regulation
SCI) has begun the process of formalizing security, capacity, and integrity
rules for exchanges, alternative trading systems, and clearing facilities.103
Among other provisions, Regulation SCI requires “SCI entities” to establish
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that their
systems maintain adequate levels of “capacity, integrity, resiliency,
availability and security,”104 and to take corrective action (including notice
to the SEC and to the public) for certain events, such as systems disruptions,
compliance issues, and intrusions.105 These initiatives—and similar
initiatives by FINRA and other SROs—will over time undoubtedly require
compliance personnel to play a more active role in identifying inter-firm and
market-wide threats to such facilities.106
D. CHALLENGES OF INFORMATIONMANAGEMENT
Compliance personnel are also increasingly responsible for managing the
collection and management of proprietary and customer information. As
discussed above,107 automated surveillance and new disclosure technologies
rely extensively on structured information. Consequently, regulators have
taken significant steps to standardize the format, as well as the content, of
information maintained or reported by firms. Compliance personnel,
however, must develop further strategies for managing information beyond
specific regulatory standards, structured or otherwise, for purposes of
maintaining internal compliance controls as well as to respond effectively to
regulatory investigations.
101. These might include, for example, discrepancies between last-sale data from individual
exchanges, alternative trading systems, and other market centers and last-sale data reported through
the consolidated feed. FLASHCRASHREPORT, supra note 42, at 36–37.
102. For example, high-volume trading can create the perception of deep liquidity in a financial
instrument: if another market participant’s automated trading strategy uses volume as an exclusive
or primary heuristic for liquidity, it may trigger trading activity in a financial instrument for which
long-term buying or selling interest is in fact limited. Id. at 15 (describing the “Sell Algorithm” of
the “Fundamental Seller” that triggered the Flash Crash).
103. Regulation SCI-Systems Complaince and Integrity, 17 C.F.R. § 242.1000 (2016).
104. Id. § 242.1001(a)(1).
105. Id. § 242.1002(a)–(c).
106. See, e.g., id. § 242.1004 (requiring certain designated participants in “SCI entities” to
participate in “scheduled functional and performance testing” of the operation of their business
continuity and disaster recovery plans, including the coordinated testing of such plans “on an
industry-or sector-wide basis with other SCI entities”).
107. See supra Part I.A.
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For instance, compliance personnel must adapt recordkeeping and
reporting practices with the evolving expectations of regulators and SROs.
As regulators press for more structured information to facilitate automated
surveillance, operations and compliance personnel may lose the flexibility to
tailor their systems unless they can effectively negotiate information
management. Moreover, as regulatory demands for unstructured information
increase108—and the penalties for noncompliance become increasingly
severe109—firms have been required to devote significant compliance hours
to document production.110 Accordingly, compliance personnel will need to
work with federal, SRO, and state regulators to develop workable protocols
for coordinating and streamlining information requests. 111
At the same time, compliance personnel must also consider the
cybersecurity and fiduciary implications of maintaining highly structured
information. While critics of regulatory surveillance view centralized
information gathering as “a hacker’s dream and a civil libertarian’s
nightmare,”112 firms are not immune to data security breaches.113
Cybersecurity measures, moreover, do not necessarily preclude information
from being released through lawful methods, such as the Freedom of
Information Act,114 or prevent rogue regulatory personnel or competitors
from reverse-engineering proprietary trading algorithms.115 As a result, part
of the compliance officer’s task must be to find ways to preserve control over
information—including information shared with regulators—to tailor its
utility to legitimate regulatory and operational purposes.
Compliance personnel must specifically develop protocols for
recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure obligations for sensitive customer
108. SIA 2006 STUDY, supra note 5, at 23.
109. Under the FINRA Sanctions Guidelines, a bar is now standard for Rule 8210 violations if
the individual fails to respond or “[w]here the individual provided a partial but incomplete response,
. . . unless the person can demonstrate that the information provided substantially complied with all
aspects of the request.” FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., SANCTIONS GUIDELINES 33 (2015)
[hereinafter SANCTIONS GUIDELINES], http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Sanctions_Guide
lines.pdf.
110. SIA 2006 STUDY, supra note 5, at 23.
111. In 2001, for example, the SEC required broker-dealers to compile detailed transaction
information in a standardized format upon request for surveillance purposes. Nazareth & Tahyar,
supra note 20, at 158–75.
112. Oversight of the Office of Financial Research and the Financial Stability Oversight Council:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Rep. Jeb Hensarling, Vice Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.).
113. See generally, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., NOTICE TO MEMBERS 05-49
SAFEGUARDING CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER INFORMATION (July 2005), http://www.finra.org/
industry/notices/05-49.
114. Bloomberg, for example, recently invoked the Act to obtain and publish information about
government loans obtained by private banks through the various lending facilities created during
the financial crises. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143,
145–146 (2d Cir. 2010). And, of course, Congress may always subpoena information known to exist
within the Office. Nazareth & Tahyar, supra note 20, at 180–81.
115. See Nazareth & Tahyar, supra note 20, at 161.
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information. The more granularity that regulators require firms to maintain,
report, or disclose, the greater the risk that such information may be “de-
anonymized” by those with access to such information to reveal the identity
of customers and their financial status. FINRA’s CARDS proposal, for
example, was criticized for the significant volume of customer-level account
information FINRA required firms to store and its implications for customer
privacy.116 Similarly, the SEC’s revisions to the Asset-Backed Securities
Regulation (Regulation AB) faced significant headwinds from privacy
advocates who objected to the public disclosure and availability (in XBRL
format) of borrower loan-level or asset-level data in connection with the offer
of securitized products.117
E. COMPLIANCECULTURE
Automated surveillance will also have significant consequences for how
rank-and-file employees—including both front-office and back-office
personnel—perceive the role of law and regulation in firm culture.
Commentators have long argued that effective compliance systems require
the development of an overriding normative compliance framework. While a
firm “tone at the top” is essential, an effective compliance system must
generate a spirit of compliance throughout the organization by reinforcing
“principles of the trade” or the “integrity” of advisory and brokerage
functions. 118 This is especially important in light of the fact that sales
representatives are subject to significant financial pressure to sell securities
116. See CARDS RULE PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 5–6 (discussing concerns about the
collection of “personally identifying information”); Sandra Fulton, Government Agency Proposes
Datamining Individuals’ Financial Transactions, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 24, 2014, 4:13
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/government-agency-proposes-datamining-individuals-financial-tr
ansactions.
117. Re-opening of Comment Period for Asset-Backed Securities Release, Securities Act Release
No. 9552, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,361, 11,361 (Feb. 28, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 229,
230, 232, 239, 240, 243, 249) (soliciting comment as to whether to scale back the granularity of
asset-level data published on EDGAR or to permit issuers to control access as necessary to address
privacy concerns).
118. Barbara Black, Curbing Broker-Dealers’ Abusive Sales Practices: Does Professor Jensen’s
Integrity Framework Offer a Better Approach?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 771, 789 (2013)
(contrasting the views of James Fanto and Michael Jensen). For example, FINRA has undertaken
to assess the frameworks that firms use “to develop, communicate and assess conformance with
their culture” based on the following:
five indicators of a firm’s culture: (i) whether control functions are valued within the
organization; (ii) whether policy or control breaches are tolerated; (iii) whether the
organization seeks to proactively identify risk and compliance events; (iv) whether
supervisors are effective role models of firm culture; and (iv) whether firms identify and
address sub-cultures—such as the culture at a branch office, a trading desk or an
investment banking department—that may not conform to the overall corporate culture.
Establishing, Communicating and Implementing Cultural Values, FIN. INDUSTRYREG. AUTHORITY
(Feb. 2016), http://www.finra.org/industry/establishing-communicating-and-implementing-cultur
al-values#sthash.zV9DMaYV.dpuf [hereinafter Establishing Cultural Values].
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products, which may often muddle the message compliance personnel are
charged to convey.119
Automation can both help and hurt in this regard. Certainly, automated
systems can incorporate legal or regulatory principles into algorithmic
decision-makingmodels, whether through hardwiring or machine learning.120
Computer-guided decision-making may also reinforce mindful adherence to
suitability or other ethical obligations by associated persons.121 At the same
time, automated systems may alienate rank-and-file personnel beset by
prompts and nudges that create “ambiguity and confusion” about their
employers’ expectations.122 In the worst case, sales and trading personnel
may game automated compliance systems—for example, by entering false or
misleading information—for the purpose of generating desired outcomes.123
This might be a particularly advantageous strategy when they believe such
systems are maintained by off-site or third-party compliance personnel.124
Automationmay also affect the incentives of supervisory and compliance
personnel. In particular, the circumstances justifying personal liability for
supervisory and compliance failures have significant implications for efforts
by firms to build effective compliance systems.125 On the one hand,
119. See Arthur B. Laby, Regulatory Convergence and Organizational Culture, 90 TUL. L. REV.
1181, 1190–92 (2016); Emily Glazer, How Wells Fargo’s High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled
Out of Control, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016, 3:10 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-
fargos-high-pressure-sales-culture-spiraled-out-of-control-1474053044 (describing how “hourly
targets, fear of being fired and bonuses” drove Wells Fargo employees to continue to open bank
accounts for customers without authorization on a firm-wide scale despite compliance training and
internal investigations).
120. See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (discussing the availability of tools in automated decision-making systems “to assure that
substantive policy choices are effectively implemented in automated decisions beyond the simple
determination that rules are consistently applied”); see also Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial
Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the
Futures Markets, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 509 (discussing strategies for how moral and
ethical knowledge could be implanted into derivatives intermediaries).
121. See, e.g., Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance through
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 966–68 (2012) (discussing the
positive and negative effects of “command and control” compliance systems).
122. Cf. Alex Rosen Blat & Luke Stark, Uber Drivers: Information Asymmetries and Control in
Dynamic Work 14 (Ctr. of European Policy Studies Workshop Paper Oct. 15, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2686227 (concluding that “[n]ew forms of labor communications are
needed to address the inconsistencies of work that is characterized by algorithmic dynamism and
ambiguous information flows to improve labor-platform relations”).
123. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age,
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 714 (2010) (observing that “[t]he predictability of rule-bound code and the
often static nature of technological implementations can permit individual actors motivated by
organizational incentives and individual greed to manipulate their behavior in ways that mask its
riskiness from technological sensitivity”).
124. Id. (adding that “[l]ayers of technological opacity . . . can shield such behavior from both
internal and external oversight until negative outcomes manifest themselves”).
125. Stephen Joyce, Scrutiny of Compliance Personnel May Backfire, SIFMA Exec Says,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.bna.com/scrutiny-compliance-personnel-n579820
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enforcement personnel recognize that investigation of the conduct of
compliance personnel—such as for “failure to monitor” rank-and-file
employees—may discourage them from actively engaging with the business
sides of firms.126 On the other hand, regulators continue to bring enforcement
actions against individuals who, in their judgment, fail “vigorously” to
prevent misconduct within a firm.127
The availability of automated compliance may therefore provide a further
excuse for compliance personnel to avoid active engagement in the
supervision of associated persons. Some commentators already fear that
compliance departments may not properly train supervisory personnel in the
use of their systems, or integrate their systems with those of supervisors, to
avoid such liability.128 In larger firms, legal, compliance, and supervisory
personnel may further silo themselves within the firm’s governance structure
to avoid supervisory liability. In former SEC Commissioner Daniel
Gallagher’s words, penalizing “robust engagement on the part of legal and
compliance personnel” creates a “dangerous dilemma” for firms in defining
the limitations of the liability of compliance personnel within a firm.129
IV. ENHANCING HUMAN AGENCY IN COMPLIANCE
To address these foreseeable complications, enhancing human agency in
compliance may thus be a necessary counterweight to the rapid automation
of securities trading and securities regulation. By reinforcing existing
relationships between compliance personnel, managers, and regulators, as
well as across compliance personnel at peer firms, the financial services
industry can collaboratively detect and address incipient threats to market
69526/ (arguing that fear of personal liability may dissuade qualified individuals from assuming
high-risk compliance assignments, such as responsibility for anti-money laundering rules).
126. For example, senior SEC and FINRA enforcement officials have publicly suggested that
enforcement action against compliance personnel should be taken only when they are “affirmatively
involved in the misconduct, helped mislead regulators or had a clear responsibility to implement
programs and policies and wholly failed to carry out their responsibilities.” Id. (quoting Stephanie
Avakian, Deputy Director of the SEC Enforcement Division, and paraphrasing comments of
Bradley Bennett, Executive Vice President of Enforcement at FINRA).
127. In re Urban, Exchange Act Release No. 66,259, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3366,
99 SEC Docket 994, 2010 WL 3500928, at *39 (Sept. 8, 2010) (noting the Division of
Enforcement’s position “that once Urban became involved in addressing the red flags, he was
obligated to respond vigorously and that he failed to do so”). Although the administrative law judge
in Urban ultimately found that Urban had acted reasonably and that no remedial action was
appropriate, it nevertheless held that “the case law dictates that Urban be found to be Glantz’s
supervisor,” notwithstanding the fact that “Urban did not have any of the traditional powers
associated with a person supervising brokers.” Id. at *44.
128. See Tilkin, supra note 79, at 68–69 (observing that compliance software must be “fully
distribut[ed] up and down the chain of command” in order to fulfill its purpose).
129. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at The SEC Speaks in
2012, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 24, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/136517
1489872; see also Martin, supra note 63, at 175 (stating that “[t]o do the job well, a CCO has to be
able to influence workers and managers, but to avoid liability, the CCO cannot operate as their
supervisor”).
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integrity and business conduct. Branding the value added by compliance—
both internally and externally—may also counteract the complacency and
alienation that automation may breed. At the same time, firms and regulators
should not be reluctant to eliminate human agency where it adds little value,
and more generally to rationalize the cost of compliance, so as to maximize
the autonomy and efficiency of human personnel.
A. INTEGRATINGCOMPLIANCE PERSONNEL IN STANDARD-
SETTING
Because the institutional competence and institutional incentives of
regulatory and compliance personnel are often in tension, standard-setting
must remain a collaborative project among federal regulators and industry
representatives. The rise of automated surveillance requires—for the
convenience of both compliance personnel and regulators—standards of
conduct that can be manageably upheld through a combination of human and
automated surveillance. The authority of compliance personnel in firms is
enhanced to the extent that they have multiple and effective opportunities to
influence the development of regulatory mandates.
1. Maintaining Relationships with Regulators
The more opportunities that regulators can provide compliance and
operations personnel to participate in standard-setting, the more effective
automated surveillance and compliance systems will be. Regulators have
traditionally relied on SROs to take the lead with respect to standard-
setting—particularly in circumstances where the industry collectively
benefits from coordinated activity, but no one firm captures a sufficient share
of the benefit to justify the cost of maintaining, complying with, or enforcing
the standard.130 When regulators take standard-setting in house, however,
firms must contribute through more stylized channels, such as individual or
industry comments. As a result, regulators may develop standards that are
difficult to interpret and enforce.131
The recent debate over whether the SEC should adopt a fiduciary
standard for retail investment advice illustrates how difficult it is to
implement qualitative standards into an effective compliance program. The
steps required under traditional know-your-customer and suitability
130. For example, SROs provide much of the infrastructure for the collection and dissemination
of real-time information and trading activity in equity securities, financial derivatives, and
benchmarks. DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 11, at 156–58. Their control of the mechanisms of
collection and distribution of such information effectively sets most of the technical standards for
those information products. Id.
131. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKEL.J. 557,
621–23 (1992) (contrasting the ex-ante costs of developing rules with the ex-post costs of applying
and enforcing standards); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961–68
(1995) (contrasting, inter alia, the strengths and weaknesses of rules, standards, and principles as
sources of law).
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obligations may well be sufficiently objective to be subject to automated
information gathering, analysis, and surveillance, with compliance officers
following up on exception reports and other red flags as appropriate.132
Implementing a higher standard of loyalty—such as the fiduciary or “best
interests” standard applicable to investment advisers—could require
significantly more complex procedures for broker-dealers that participate in
securities distributions, engage in principal trading, or sell proprietary
products.133
While some of these procedures may be readily susceptible to
automation, others would need to be developed over time through the
iterative experience of compliance officers. For example, regulators and
compliance personnel could use various performance benchmarks and testing
procedures to analyze whether a firm’s financial products or transactions are
suitable for customers.134 Compliance personnel will play a key role in
identifying practices at the sales level that implicate fiduciary concerns,
developing supervisory procedures and surveillance mechanisms that flag
violative transactions or omissions, and defending their interpretation of the
fiduciary mandate in enforcement and arbitration proceedings.
2. Maintaining Relationships Across Firms
The active involvement of competent compliance personnel must also
play a role in developing new industry sales and trading platforms and
associated surveillance mechanisms. While no one firm always benefits from
an investment in developing new standards, the long-term benefits of limiting
suboptimal standard-setting at the regulatory level is often worth the effort.
As a result, compliance personnel may play an important role in developing
industry trading and surveillance practices, which may then be incorporated
into federal and SRO surveillance mechanisms.
Delegation to private standard-setting associations has often been an
effective strategy for implementing certain technical or business standards.
132. For example, FINRA’s suitability rule comprises three components: “reasonable-basis
suitability, customer-specific suitability, and quantitative suitability.” FINRAMANUALR. 2111(a),
supp. material .05. A CARDS-style compliance program could monitor the suitability of
recommended products based on each customer’s investment profile, including their “age, other
investments, financial situation and needs, tax status, investment objectives, investment experience,
investment time horizon, liquidity needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer
may disclose.” Id. at 2111(a). A CARDS-style compliance program could also perform a
quantitative assessment that “a series of recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed
in isolation, are not excessive and unsuitable for the customer when taken together in light of the
customer’s investment profile.” Id. at 2111(a), supp. material .05(c).
133. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should
Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 743 (2012) (discussing the differences between the
standards applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers).
134. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309,
1360–68 (2015) (outlining how benchmarks and testing could be developed for consumer products,
including consumer financial products).
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For example, generally accepted accounting principles or internal controls
for disclosure and financial reporting were historically the product of the
accounting and auditing professions in the United States.135 As a more recent
example, the recent crisis has rekindled interest in automating fixed-income
trading through trading systems that aggregate inventory across firms.136
Developing rules for best execution or permissible markups in such systems,
however, will require particularized knowledge, especially given the
inventory risk associated with fixed-income trading practices.137
Because standards necessarily impact different firms in different ways,
legal and compliance officers are uniquely situated to uphold governance
structures that provide firms with a meaningful opportunity to participate in
the standard-setting process. While deference to compliance professionals
may sometimes achieve a better result than formal rulemaking, regulators are
keenly observant of the accessibility, funding, governance, and standard-
setting processes of private standard setters.138 In particular, both SROs and
trade associations have sought to maintain diversity in representation of firms
of different sizes and with different business models, to allay fears that larger
firms employ their weight in such bodies to promote standards that are too
costly or burdensome for smaller firms.139
B. ENHANCING THE INTERNAL PERCEPTION OFCOMPLIANCE
Clarifying and highlighting the role of compliance personnel may also
enhance the internal perception of compliance and how compliance adds
value to the firm. The relationship between a firm’s compliance and
135. See, e.g., TIM BÜTHE&WALTERMATTLI, THENEW GLOBALRULES: THE PRIVATIZATION
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 60–98 (Princeton U. Press 2011) (observing the
institutional history of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the United States and how the
standard-setting hierarchy it oversees gives it a “strong position to speak with a single voice on
behalf of U.S. interests” in the efforts to harmonize international accounting standards).
136. See, e.g., Katie Linsell, John Glover & Nabila Ahmed, Banks Unite in Project Neptune to
Boost Bond Trading, BLOOMBERGBUS. (Oct. 6, 2014, 7:44 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2014-10-06/banks-said-to-unite-in-project-neptune-to-increase-bond-trading.
137. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 14-52 PRICING
DISCLOSURE IN THE FIXED INCOME MARKETS 9 (Nov. 2014) [hereinafter PRICING DISCLOSURE]
(distinguishing markups in “trades in the same security where the firm and the customer trades occur
on the same trading day, most of [which] occur in close time proximity to each other,” frommarkups
on securities held overnight, where “concerns that intervening news or market movement that occur
between the component trades would create a corresponding change in the price differential between
the components”).
138. See DOMBALAGIAN, supra note 11, at 126–30.
139. Of course, SROs are membership organizations with a statutory obligation to ensure
nondiscriminatory access to membership and to guarantee fair representation in governance. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (2012). As entities with quasi-public obligations, moreover, their
rules, policies, and procedures are subject to regulatory review and public notice and comment for
compliance with “core principles” or other statutory obligations. To the extent that SROs establish
standards through formal rules, the Exchange Act ensures an opportunity for public notice and
comment in the standard-setting process. Id. § 78s. For a description of the “mini-APA” provisions
of Exchange Act §19, see LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 6:53–139 (4th ed. 2011).
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supervisory hierarchies is not always clear. For smaller firms, compliance
and supervisory responsibilities may well be carried out by the same
individuals within the firm. In larger firms, compliance personnel are often
viewed as individuals with legal or regulatory backgrounds, who have little
exposure to the business side of the firms by which they are employed, apart
from their compliance role.140
Courts and regulators, moreover, have done little to dispel perception of
compliance personnel as a cost center.141 For example, even as FINRA has
renewed its interest in the efforts of its member firms to promote a culture of
compliance,142 it is difficult to transmute the quality of a firm’s compliance
culture into a compelling business advantage, apart from the mitigation of
sanctions in the occasional disciplinary action.143 Highlighting tangible
reputational benefits of compliance would create greater incentive for both
compliance personnel and business managers to collaborate on the design of
more effective compliance controls.144
1. Regulatory Performance Standards
In recent years, regulators have explored the broader use of performance
disclosures or performance standards as a means to improve the public
accountability of regulated entities. Performance disclosures, for example,
are aimed at informing prospective customers of the integrity and efficiency
of various securities intermediaries.145 Mutual fund performance disclosures
have long been a staple of retail investment decisionmaking, though not
140. Fanto, supra note 9, at 123–24. Supervisory responsibilities, by contrast, tend to fall on
business managers, who rise from the ranks based on exceptional performance as front-line
employees, who are compensated based on the performance of their underlings and therefore face
many of the same conflicts of interest. Id. at 144–48. In such circumstances, supervisory
responsibility for their noncompliance may be easier to justify. Id. at 147–49.
141. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 40 J. CORP. L.
55, 72 (2014) (discussing the place of profit and cost centers in the hierarchy of financial firms).
142. Establishing Cultural Values, supra note 118 (notice of FINRA’s plan to “meet with
executive business, compliance, legal and risk management staff [of member firms] to discuss
cultural values [and how each firm] communicates and reinforces those values directly, implicitly
and through its reward system”).
143. Within the context of enforcement actions, they often recognize the existence and efficacy
of adequate compliance controls as a mitigating factor when the firm faces liability for the actions
of its employees. For example, the SEC and FINRA each factor the effectiveness of a firm’s
compliance regime into the determination of sanctions for violative conduct. In re Millenium Grp.
of N.Y., Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 3 (Oct. 23, 2001) (setting forth “some
of the criteria [the SEC] will consider in determining whether, and howmuch, to credit self-policing,
self-reporting, remediation and cooperation”); SANCTIONS GUIDELINES, supra note 109, at 6
(instructing adjudicators to consider “[w]hether, at the time of the violation, the respondent member
firm had developed reasonable supervisory, operational and/or technical procedures or controls that
were properly implemented”).
144. Stephen P. Wink, The Bankruptcy of the Securities Market Paradigm, 9 VA. BUS. L. REV.
369, 387 (2015) (highlighting the benefits of an incentive based regulatory approach).
145. Willis, supra note 134, at 1335–40.
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without controversy.146 Credit rating agencies in the wake of Dodd-Frank
have become subject to more onerous performance reporting to help investors
assess their credit ratings.147 The SEC requires trading venues and brokerage
firms to publish statistics designed to help investors assess the quality of a
trading venue’s price discovery process or a broker’s execution services.148
Performance standards, meanwhile, allow regulators to monitor activity
at individual firms and to take appropriate remedial action where appropriate.
Exchanges may employ statistical measures to assess the quality of execution
provided by their designated market makers.149 The Volcker Rule assesses
the bona fide market making related activities of bank-affiliated dealers based
on performance metrics relating to sources of revenue, risk, and variance.150
Recently, for example, FINRA began to grade firms based on the extent to
which they permit spoofing—i.e., the placement of fake orders to manipulate
other traders into revealing trading interest or trading against their interest—
through their order books.151
More generally, as regulators standardize quantifiable metrics for best
execution and suitability through their automated surveillance tools, it will
become increasingly possible to provide similar “report cards” for best
execution and suitability not only at the firm level,152 but with respect to
individual trades. For example, regulators might eventually be able to bypass
firms and provide investors with information about the quality of individual
executions, or the performance of a portfolio against the aggregate returns to
comparably situated investors.153 In such a world, compliance personnel may
146. See, e.g., Black, supra note 17, at 325–26 (discussing the importance retail investors place
on past performance of mutual funds even as they do a “poor job of providing investors with the
necessary information to evaluate the overall costs of their investments”).
147. Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 72,936,
79 Fed. Reg. 55,078, 55,262–67 (Sept. 15, 2014) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17g-1, 240.17g-2,
240.17g-7).
148. See Regulation NMS, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.605, 243.606 (2016).
149. See, e.g., Rule 8.60: Evaluation of Trading Crowd Performance, CHI. BD. OPTIONS EXCH.
(June 18, 2010), http://wallstreet.cch.com/cboe/rules/cboe-rules/chp_1_1/chp_1_1_8/chp_1_1_8_
2/default.asp; Rule 104: Dealings and Responsibilities of DMMs, N.Y. STOCKEXCH. (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://nyserules.nyse.com/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/chp_1_3/chp_1_3_7/chp_1_3_7_8/default.asp; see
also Stanislav Dolgopolov, Providing Liquidity in a High-Frequency World: Trading Obligations
and Privileges of Market Makers and a Private Right of Action, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
303, 356–57 (2013).
150. 12 C.F.R. pt. 248, app. A (2016).
151. Letter from Rick Ketchum, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.,
2016 Regulatory and Examination Priorities Letter (Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.finra.org/industry/
2016-regulatory-and-examination-priorities-letter.
152. Equity Report Cards, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/
industry/report-center/equity-report-cards (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (providing firm report cards,
inter alia, for best execution, market order timeliness, and trade-throughs, among other metrics).
153. See, e.g., PRICING DISCLOSURE, supra note 137 (proposed rule requiring firms to disclose
on the customer confirmation the contemporaneous purchase price of securities in fixed-income
transactions). See alsoMUN. SEC. RULEMAKINGBD., REGULATORYNOTICE 2015-16 6–7 (Sept. 24,
2015), http://www.msrb.org/~/media/files/regulatory-notices/rfcs/2015-16.ashx (requiring the
same for municipal securities transactions).
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be invited to play a more proactive role in “tutoring” supervisors and
representatives on how to meet performance targets, or justifying and
documenting deviations from regulatory standards when necessary to meet
specific customer needs.
It is nevertheless difficult to design outcomemeasures that signal a robust
compliance culture, let alone measures that are sufficiently objective to
provide more than reputational rewards. Disclosure-based regulation often
“presupposes investors who are capable of understanding the information”
and that dedicated investor-education efforts are necessary to make
disclosure-based regulation meaningful.154 As suggested above, efforts to
grade compliance through quantitative metrics may of course backfire, if
firms or their employees merely adapt sales techniques to game surveillance
mechanisms.155 The SEC’s response to unrealistic statistical reporting on its
enforcement results, as Velikonja’s study demonstrates, provides a
cautionary example of how performance standards may distort incentives.156
2. The Revolving Door
Improving the image of compliance personnel within firms may also
require commentators to reconsider longstanding prejudices against
encouraging employees—in particular, junior compliance personnel—to
cycle through business, compliance, and regulatory careers. Commentators
are rightfully wary of the perverse incentives created by a “revolving door”
between private industry and the public sector: senior regulatory personnel
with policy-making authority at administrative agencies are often lawyers or
economists who are recruited from, and later return to, industry or private
practice after public service.157 As a result, they may have an incentive to act
in a manner that maintains and augments the authority of the agency during
their tenure to ensure well-compensated employment in the regulated
industry when they retire.158
By the same token, however, mid-and junior-level compliance personnel
can benefit significantly in understanding how regulation works through a
combination of regulatory and business experience. Rather than viewing
business and compliance as separate silos, for example, there may be a long-
term advantage in improving the quality of regulation and compliance if
firms cultivated the careers of compliance personnel in a manner that
promotes broader exposure to business and regulatory concerns. This may
include time at a regulatory agency or SRO, or rotation through standing
154. Black, supra note 17, at 334–36.
155. See sources cited supra notes 123–124.
156. Velikonja, supra note 53, at 933–40.
157. For a discussion of the literature, see David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving
Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (2013).
158. Id. at 520 (noting an agent’s self-interest in diligently furthering agency objectives).
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committees of regulatory advisory committees or industry trade
associations.159
C. RATIONALIZING THE ROLE OFCOMPLIANCE PERSONNEL
Finally, to the extent automation is inevitable, it should be leveraged to
maximum efficiency so that compliance personnel are free to devote their
time and energy to activities where human agency demonstrably adds value.
As clearing services consolidate in a handful of carrying brokers, much of
the back-office compliance responsibility of smaller firms may be
alleviated.160 There are nevertheless several aspects of compliance that could
be automated at the federal or SRO level to alleviate firms of the burden to
establish duplicative systems or to dedicate personnel to routine activities. As
a simple example, regulators could contract with other federal agencies and
with public records firms to maintain and verify financial disclosures by
associated persons or to monitor continuing education requirements on an
automated basis.
The rollout of new compliance mandates, moreover, could be
streamlined across federal regulators and self-regulatory bodies. Industry
naturally resists the incremental burdens of new regulation, since firms bear
all of the cost of newmandates while regulators and the investing public share
most of their positive externalities. Those burdens could be made less
onerous by timing federal and SROmandates around a development schedule
that allows compliance personnel to plan the rollout of new recordkeeping or
reporting software in conjunction with systems modifications to other aspects
of the firm’s internal controls. Such a schedule would not only allow
compliance personnel to make intelligent choices about how to implement
newmandates, but would facilitate more effective training of compliance and
supervisory personnel in the use of new data and surveillance tools.
Better data standards may also eliminate the need for in-house forensic
analysis of data without necessarily requiring firms to cede control over their
proprietary and customer information. Compliance officers routinely
complain of the “unnecessary and burdensome duplication of effort” to fit
the different formats and informational needs of different regulators.161 In
some respects, the consolidation of federal and SRO authority over data may
achieve this goal. For example, FINRA’s consolidation of self-regulatory
authority in the securities industry may help over time to eliminate
159. See Katz, supra note 37, at 512 (observing that a “regular stream of knowledgeable people
from the industry” would address the need to build a staff “possessing the broader mix of the skills
that are needed to be a modern regulator” as well as the problem of “staff isolation from the industry
it regulates”).
160. See, e.g., CARDS RULE PROPOSAL, supra note 24, at 4, 9–10 (discussing the decision to
impose recordkeeping obligations primarily on carrying or clearing firms “[t]o minimize the impact
on small and mid-size firms”).
161. SIA 2006 STUDY, supra note 5, at 17.
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redundancies in regulatory standards, while the OFR may eventually develop
recordkeeping standards that apply across all firms and harmonize with those
required by foreign regulators.
To this end, policy makers may consider whether redundancies may be
further reduced through the streamlining of information-gathering exercises.
For example, in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,162 Congress sought to balance
the need for multiple regulators to obtain information through reporting and
examination requirements against the often duplicative and inconsistent
nature of such requests.163 To achieve this goal, Congress established a
hierarchy of public and private information sources for financial regulators
to consult before compelling the production of new information or
conducting an independent examination.164 A similar policy for federal and
state securities regulators would help promote investment in new information
gathering systems.
CONCLUSION
Information technology and automation may ultimately not supplant
human autonomy as much as “move and reorient human presence and
action.”165 Just like robots patrolling the skies, exploring the ocean floors,
and circling the globe, automated surveillance and compliance systems can
see what we cannot see and do what we cannot do, but do not necessarily
know what to look for, where to look for it, what it means, and how best to
respond to it. As human beings, that is our job. The task we must set for
ourselves is to figure out how best to use the tools at our disposal to enhance
the human experience, and in the case of financial services, to advance the
goals of market efficiency, integrity, and investor protection.
In part, this means taking compliance out of the metaphorical “back
office” and placing it on the “front line.” For compliance personnel to build
and manage the surveillance systems of the future, they must be experts in
financial services and maintain relationships with peers, regulators, and
related industries to be better able to anticipate and prevent internal and
162. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2012).
163. See S. REP. NO. 105-336, at 46 (1998) (noting that Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s reporting
framework “streamlines the regulatory process by requiring coordination and information-sharing
between the various Federal and State regulators”).
164. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1844(c)(1)(B), 1844(2)(B) (requiring the Federal Reserve Board, “to the fullest
extent possible,” to use “(i) reports and other supervisory information that the [supervised entity]
has been required to provide to other Federal or State regulatory agencies; (ii) externally audited
financial statements . . . ; (iii) information otherwise available from Federal or State regulatory
agencies; and (iv) information that is otherwise required to be reported publicly,” as well as
“examination reports made by other Federal or State regulatory agencies relating to a bank holding
company and any subsidiary of a bank holding company” in its supervisory activities); id. §
1844(c)(2)(C) (similarly requiring the Board to “avoid duplication of examination activities,
reporting requirements, and requests for information” through prior consultation with other federal
and state regulators).
165. MINDELL, supra note 2, at 15.
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external risks. Firms that fail to make these investments in human
autonomy—the cultivation of informed, credible, and empowered
compliance personnel—may well succumb to the weaknesses and limitations
of the automated systems they create. Those who rise to the challenge,
however, will harness the power of financial technology for the betterment
of the investing public.
